UNDERSTANDING HEGEL 19
OR: NO MORE THESIS — ANTITHESIS — SYNTHESIS
Win Corduan
Part 19 Hegel and the Rational and the Real
The statement comes from the preface of the Philosophy of Right. I am quoting from the on-line version provided by Marxists.org, which does not have page numbers, but it's short enough to find what we need. The topic that Hegel was pursuing in this context was not philosophical methodology, let alone metaphysics, but the sorry state of what was being published under the heading of philosophy, particularly political philosophy, in his day. It seemed as though everyone was advocating freedom, and that meant novelty, regardless of whether it might just be utterly irrational, a situation that has no doubt persisted into our day and, I fear, will not fade away as long as human beings have minds capable of language and fingers that can be used to preserve the mind's conclusions in some medium. Hegel states sarcastically:
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Thought then regards itself as free only when it is conscious of being at variance with what is generally recognized, and of setting itself up as something original. The idea that freedom of thought and mind is indicated only by deviation from, or even hostility to what is everywhere recognised, is most persistent with regard to the state. The essential task of a philosophy of the state would thus seem to be the discovery and publication of a new and original theory. |
One problem besetting these new and supposedly creative philosophies, which are actually mere opinions, is that they are usually idealistic and ignore the present for the sake of a fictional future.
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When reflection, feeling or whatever other form the subjective consciousness may assume, regards the present as vanity, and thinks itself to be beyond it and wiser, it finds itself in emptiness, and, as it has actuality only in the present, it is vanity throughout. |
It is in this context that Hegel wishes to call back philosophy, including political philosophy, to rationality. Philosophy needs to deal with the reality of the present and treat it with rationality. It needs to find the rationality that is intrinsic to reality, and it needs to apply rational categories, not wishful thinking, to its analysis.
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What is rational is real, |
So far so good. Philosophy should be connected up with reality. But the question arises as to where that connection occurs. How do ideas hook themselves into reality?
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Against the doctrine that the idea is a mere idea, figment or opinion, philosophy preserves the more profound view that nothing is real except the idea. Hence arises the effort to recognise in the temporal and transient the substance, which is immanent, and the eternal, which is present. The rational is synonymous with the idea, because in realizing itself it passes into external existence. It thus appears in an endless wealth of forms, figures and phenomena. It wraps its kernel round with a robe of many colours, in which consciousness finds itself at home. |
So, ideas are tied to reality because the Idea is ultimate reality. This is not a helpful declaration because it is merely a repetition of the nature of Hegel's system. Hegel's presupposition throughout is that his transcendental system reveals what is real, but this is exactly the theory that we are questioning. We can affirm that what is real is rational under any number of descriptions; but whether we want to say that "what is rational is real" depends on some closer analysis of what one might mean herpe by "rational" and "real."
Let us assume that "reality" refers to something "other," which we experience, perhaps with a naive realsim, as existing independently of our knowledge of it. But, insofar as we can have awareness of it, our beliefs concerning it are true insofar as they do correspond to this reality. Let us also continue to stipulate the first half of the slogan, namely that there is a rationality inherent in reality. By that I mean that the so-called laws of thought—identity, contradiction, excluded middle—apply both de dicto and de re, viz., to our language and to the reality to which our language refers. Without this supposition, it would not be possible for us to arrive at conclusions with a sound argument, one in which the premises are true and the logic is valid. In that case, what is rational is real because a sound argument cannot have true premises and a false conclusion. But note that the idea of correspondence to reality assumes that reality exists, or, to put it another way, has being.
However, if we give a more limited definition for "what is rational," such as mere logical validity, the slogan does not hold. We can easily construct arguments with false premises and valid logic, in which case the truth of the conclusion (correspondence to reality) is not guaranteed. E.g.,
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If I live in a tree house, then I live in Indiana. |
It is true that I live in Indiana, but this argument does not show it to be so because I don't live in a tree house. The logic of this argument is valid and the conclusion is true, but the premises are false. Worse yet,
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If I live on West Street, then I live on the moon. |
Well, there's nothing wrong with the logic, but I'm quite certain that I don't live on the moon. So, if by "what is rational" we mean merely "logical validity," then what is rational may not be real a all.
How do I know that I do not live on the moon? To put it simply, not by a transcendental argument. I cannot even evaluate that notion without first stipulating that a reality exists (or has being). In short, it is my assessment that the statement that "what is rational is real" can only be maintained by engaging in some fundamental metaphysics. It is not sustainable in a transcendental system that relies on shapes of consciousness without an ontological foundation.
